“Still knocking, as the doors close.” The Economist. June 19, 2008.
An annotation
The plight of refugees remains one of the most pressing and contentious facing the international community today. Despite passage of international legal standards on the treatment and protection of refugees, many of those fleeing harm and persecution are increasingly greeted with hostility and discrimination upon arrival in “safe” foreign lands.
“After a welcome decline between 2001 and 2005, the number of refugees—in the classic sense of people forced to leave their countries because of war or persecution—rose in 2007 for the second straight year.”
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the increase in refugees is due in large part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As stated in the 1951 Convention Relating the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, “refugees are those individuals fleeing from their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political opinion.” However, this definition does not account for individuals displaced by mounting international problems of natural disaster, economic instability, and food shortage. The UNHCR comments that if statistics on refugees were expanded to include these individuals, the numbers of fugitives would increase drastically. Here, questions arise over the established UNHCR definition of refugees, and the possible need for expansion of international norms.
“Many of the rich countries which might be able to help [refugees] are hardening their hearts, often under electoral pressure.”
With growing numbers of refugees crossing their borders, wealthy and prosperous receiving states are often left with the unpopular task of sheltering and caring for these fugitives. Amid growing public unrest and hostility towards refugees, rights groups call for a shift in the perception and treatment of those fleeing their homelands. However, this raises important questions regarding the responsibility of the state to provide for and protect refugees. Also at issue for rights groups is the fact that in many instances, based on their country of origin, some refugees are detained under harsh conditions or even turned away. Thus, with the livelihoods of millions of fugitives at stake, it is essential for states to re-examine not only the plight of refugees, but more importantly their treatment upon arrival in another country.
These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.
Friday, August 1, 2008
Editor's Introduction- August 2008
Who Counts? Refugees and the Politics of Indifference
by Sonia Cardenas
"Challenging the politics of indifference towards refugees further requires exposing narratives of fear and animosity, or hidden assumptions about who counts as a full and equal human being.”
The contemporary plight of refugees, asylum seekers, and other marginalized groups reveals the limits of international human rights norms. Numerous internationally recognized standards and laws exist for the humane treatment of people. Yet despite enormous progress, the reality is that some people are simply deemed to be less fully human than others. Nationalism and racism underlie popular indifference to today’s unwanted refugees. This is the unspoken truth that lies at the heart of the global refugee problem.
Overcoming entrenched indifference towards refugees consequently requires looking beyond state sovereignty. Effective refugee policies must turn to global governance for solutions, challenging narratives of fear and animosity as well as tackling the root problems (political and economic) that displace people from their homes. Compassion toward refugees cannot be assumed or coerced—note recent EU restrictions for asylum-seekers—though it can be constructed politically.
National governments cannot sustain liberal refugee policies indefinitely; they are too captive to short-term political calculations. In democracies, electoral pressures can push leaders to restrict migrant flows, especially during periods of economic downturn or perceived terrorist threats. In non-democracies, governments are often implicated in the conflicts from which people are fleeing; even if they offer safe passage or haven, refugees’ rights still may be compromised.
By definition, the protection of refugees poses an international problem requiring a global solution. Once people cross state borders (or once a government permits internal displacement), other states cannot be trusted to protect refugees. People who have lost the protection of their home countries should not have to depend on the goodwill of strangers. The international community must have reliable and effective mechanisms for protecting them. If this admonition sounds naïve, it is only because state sovereignty trumps human rights.
Challenging the politics of indifference towards refugees further requires exposing narratives of fear and animosity, or hidden assumptions about who counts as a full and equal human being. Here, the media can play a productive role, revealing stories of dispossession and abuse while giving a human face to distant victims. Activists should ask uncomfortable questions about why only certain refugees are worth protecting: for example, would we really close our doors to those most closely resembling us? Advocates must also confront myths about the prohibitive costs of hosting refugees, including purported rises in crime or unemployment. Where public opinion is largely indifferent or hostile to refugees, liberal political discourse should strive to be more substantive than polemical.
Fundamentally, the most effective refugee policy is comprehensive, addressing the root causes of displacement and conflict. This requires proactive inter-agency coordination, incorporating refugee issues alongside diplomatic and economic negotiations. The goal—however elusive—is ultimately to make the political category of refugees obsolete. States must become convinced that refugee problems undermine international security, making it in their interests to stem foreign conflicts. A robust international refugee policy is therefore necessarily attentive to peace building and conflict resolution.
The reluctance of wealthy countries to accept growing numbers of refugees confirms the importance of political will. Who counts as a human being worthy of protection is subject to bigotry, often manipulated by political elites. In contrast, more equitable refugee policies call for global regulatory approaches, explicit challenges to fear-inducing rhetoric, and comprehensive policies targeting the root sources of conflict. Debates over refugee policy understandably focus on sovereign states, but the key to protecting refugees lies with transforming public opinion: replacing the politics of indifference and fear with an informed politics of compassion.
Sonia Cardenas is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. She is the author of numerous publications, including Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). She is currently completing two book projects, both for the University of Pennsylvania Press— Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights and a textbook, Terror and Hope: The Politics of Human Rights in Latin America.
Social Contract in a Borderless World
by Daniel J. Graeber
"Given the declining world economy and the global uptick in violence, it is no wonder the issue is in the spotlight. Extending the social contract to outsiders in the name of philanthropy would make Milton Friedman stand up in his grave.”
Addressing the American Political Science Association in 2000, the international relations theorist Robert Keohane of Princeton University noted that effective governance in a globalized world depends more on interstate cooperation and transnational networks than any type of world body. Keohane made the claim that the people and players in a globalized world stand to gain from the system through cooperation across borders and boundaries. Nevertheless, Keohane also observed that the actors may exploit interdependence in that system by transferring blame to others and that, although institutions may be essential, they can also be dangerous. So it is when confronting the issues of forced migration and displacement. While the economic and security issues concerning displaced persons place the matter at the forefront of the global agenda, it is largely a matter for people to settle.
The article in the June 19 edition of The Economist entitled “Still knocking, as the doors close” presents the notion that many of the so-called rich countries are bowing to a widening sense of xenophobia among the European community by closing the doors on displaced persons fleeing conflict zones. The Economist says the “luckless people” in conflict zones in Central Asia and the Middle East are turning to Europe as a place of safety and source for a better future. And why shouldn't they? As Europe moves toward the next phase of geopolitical identity, that of a national federal system rather than a provincial federal system, she should expect to experience the same wave of immigration that eventually defined the multinational demographic of the United States. But at the same time, why should Europe not tackle the issue in the same fashion that the United States is tackling its own immigration problem? At which point does a nation, or supra-nation, extend its social contract to wards of the state that operate outside that contract?
The Economist points to a general rise in the number of displaced persons in the world and blames the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for contributing to that factor. As of December 2007, the number of displaced persons rose from 1.6 million in the previous year to 26 million. “And if you throw the net really wide,” the report says, to include non-conflict issues such as climate change, food shortages and natural disasters, that figure rises to 67 million.
Of these displaced millions, however, The Economist says only a small fraction sought the assistance of the U.N. human rights agency by demanding asylum in another country. It would be curious to compare that fraction with those displaced persons who are aware of such procedures or those who find U.N. procedures expeditious. Migration of a populace tends to move from a situation of deteriorating living conditions to a situation of improved living conditions. Many of the displaced, one could argue, are at or below the middle class demographic and lack any resources to give them the benefit of time. The U.S. Helsinki Commission said in an April 2008 report that the majority of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, for example, fled their homeland with few resources and have depleted whatever income they had while living as refugees. Fleeing conflict or disaster does not allow time for procedure.
The report then goes on to condemn the “returns directive” in the European Union that permits at least six-months of detention for those entering Europe illegally. The directive allows further detention of immigrants beyond the six-month term should they “fail to cooperate” with authorities. At least some of those detained as illegal immigrants, the report says, are asylum seekers and the “returns directive” is perhaps enforced in such a manner that the distinction between the two is blurred. The report then asks if it is therefore permissible for the “other rich countries” to condemn Europe for its treatment of the less fortunate. The answer is an emphatic no.
The displaced Iraqi in Jordan poses the same question facing America concerning the migration from Latin America. Specifically, illegal migration, displaced persons, and asylum seekers may become wards of the host nation, who, sometimes at great cost, use revenue derived from their populace to care for the disadvantaged. The government of Iraq, and the United Nations for that matter, heaped praise upon Jordan for its generosity in hosting refugees, but Jordan cannot maintain that assistance indefinitely. Americans, for their part, face similar issues when confronting their own immigration problem. Given the declining world economy and the global uptick in violence, it is no wonder the issue is in the spotlight. Extending the social contract to outsiders in the name of philanthropy would make Milton Friedman stand up in his grave.
The Economist notes a softening of the public perception extended toward forced migration. It points to policies embraced by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd who closed several detention centers in the country and moved to ease the process by which asylum seekers become full citizens. Keohane noted that leaders have a variety of goals, but staying in power is very near the top of their agenda. Europe may address the burdens of migration with its “returns directive,” and American may address the burden with a border fence, but it is not Europe or America who is making those decisions. It is the people who are dealing with their own degree of xenophobia that are calling the shots. The Economist notes that a lack of distinction exists in public opinion between asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. But what really is the difference when the social contract is involved? Institutions such as the UNHCR may provide a means by which displaced persons address their concerns, but for better or worse, it is not the institution’s decision to make.
Daniel J. Graeber has been a contributor to the Foreign Policy Association's Great Decisions series since its inception, writing on war crimes and international law. He has focused considerably on the legal aspects concerning the U.S.-led "war on terror" and various war crimes tribunals. He has lectured on the history of war crimes in the international arena and served as a professor of ethics at Grand Valley State University. He has published works on the history of the U.S. relationship with Israel and the U.S. foreign policy regarding Hamas. He is currently a writer for United Press International covering Iraqi political developments, as well as the oil and energy sector. He lives in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Appealing to the Realist Nature of the Problem: An Attempt to Find Common Ground
by Eric K. Leonard
"But [my students] are aware of the complexity of the problem and the need to view all issues, even those of a seemingly liberal, global governance-laden human rights perspective, from all angles. And they begin to realize that the protection of human rights, on a universal scale, may actually be in their national interest."
Whenever I teach my undergraduate course on human rights, I inevitably have one student who argues that state sovereignty trumps all and that states should act in their “national interest” in regards to issues where human rights and sovereignty clash. They usually continue the argument by stipulating that “human rights” are not defensible unless they are universally accepted, meaning contained in a universally ratified document (and they use the term “universal” literally), because all authority resides in the state. Thus, it is always an interesting discussion when we turn to the issue of migration, and more specifically, refugees. As the focal piece for this month’s roundtable, “Still knocking, as the doors close,” points out, the number of refugees continues to climb along with the number of individuals under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while the reaction of many nation-states to these increasing numbers has been to restrict the flow of migrants and tighten restrictions on these population flows. The question that I must always pose to my students is how to deal with this ever deepening issue, and more pointedly, where does responsibility reside in regards to protection?
The obvious argument of my state sovereignty focused student is that responsibility does not exist unless the state in question is a party to some international convention; and even then international law remains so ambiguous and lacking real means of enforcement, most states can simply ignore the “law” if it is not in their national interest. In other words, they take a classic realist approach to the problem. Therefore, despite the fact that there exists a widely accepted legal basis for protection of refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, it remains questionable for some whether any state responsibility to protect exists. As a result, the argument in favor of such acts as the European Union’s “returns directive” remains dependent on the notion that state sovereignty continues its preeminence in the global affairs arena.
Adding another layer to this discussion is the distinction that exists between a refugee and a migrant. According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as any person who holds a:
well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
This differs from a migrant who typically moves in order improve their socioeconomic status. However, does such a distinction matter when examining the human rights violations of individuals? It appears clear to me that although the violations of refugees may be more intense in nature, this does not dissipate the fact that socioeconomic migrants also often lack the basic human rights that are legally codified in international legal statute—such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Thus, I believe that our discussion should extend to both refugees and migrants; however, this also makes the ability to counter the state sovereignty focused student’s argument that much more difficult.
So where does responsibility reside? Do states have a responsibility to accept refugees and migrants whose human rights were being violated by their home state? My realist student would unequivocally argue no—but instead of engaging this student in the typical argument of sovereign rights versus cosmopolitanism, I believe it is more constructive to take a different tact. Yes, I could espouse the argument that the cosmopolitan basis of our humanity leads to a responsibility to protect the world’s refugees and migrants because of the human rights violations perpetrated against them. In fact, I have supported the cosmopolitan perspective and its non-state centric approach in previous roundtable entries as they pertain to such issues as the power of the Human Rights Council and humanitarian intervention. However, the problem with approaching any of the world’s problems within this argumentative framework is that the parties engaging in dialogue tend to talk past one another. If I begin my classroom discussions by espousing a definition of cosmopolitanism and the moral imperative to act, it is guaranteed that all of my realist students will simply shut down. They will find little value in this argument and fail to recognize a need to act on human rights issues such as refugee flows and mass migration. But if we refocus the topic to include a discussion of national interest, now I have their attention.
So how does the responsibility to protect affect the United States’ or any other countries’ national interest? The most obvious impact is financial, but the literature often cites concerns of national security, xenophobia, impact on scarce resources, among others. This is not say that there are no positive influences on host states, but again, such rhetoric often times fails to pierce the ideological positioning of my students. This financial burden provides an alternative rationale for action that is couched in a language that realists can understand. It provides them an impetus to act in situations of conflict and economic degradation. In fact, this was the rationale that ultimately caused President Clinton to act in Haiti during the 1990s. It was not for democratization or the promotion of his “engagement and enlargement” policy that caused a U.S. response to the crisis— it was refugee flows and the impact this had on our national interest. Such an approach tends to invoke an interesting response—my realist students begin to pay attention and the core of their argument, state sovereignty, begins to fade. They may see this issue as a responsibility to their own citizens or to their national interest, but they also understand the need to address the problem at its source. So are they now clamoring for intervention in war torn nations around the world in order to rectify the refugee problem? No. But they are aware of the complexity of the problem and the need to view all issues, even those of a seemingly liberal, global governance-laden human rights perspective, from all angles. And they begin to realize that the protection of human rights, on a universal scale, may actually be in their national interest. As a result, in a small way and in a small classroom setting, I have allowed the cosmopolitan global governance liberals to converse with the sovereignty-based realists—a small act that can hopefully be exported to a larger stage.
Eric K. Leonard is the Henkel Family Endowed Chair in International Affairs and Director of General Education at Shenandoah University in Winchester, VA. He has published several articles, case studies and a book on such issues as the International Criminal Court, humanitarian law, theoretical conceptualizations of sovereignty, and global governance. His book is entitled, The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court (Ashgate, 2005).
Thursday, November 1, 2007
November 2007: Response
Iraqi Resettlement: Why Congress Will Act
by David A. Weinberg
“While it is regretful that Congressional wheels may at times turn slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect groundbreaking legislation to assist and resettle Iraqi refugees before the year’s end.”
I would like to commend Human Rights & Human Welfare for their recent roundtable on the Iraqi refugee crisis. The Roundtable rightly draws attention to the United States government’s woefully inadequate efforts thus far to address a major humanitarian crisis of its own making.
However, I do not agree with Professor Daniel Whelan’s assessment of “why Congress won’t act” on Iraqi resettlement. Dr. Whelan argues that the new Congress appears reluctant to resettle a reasonable number of Iraqi refugees in danger because Democrats fear that doing so would precipitate Iraqi state failure by means of “brain drain.” Instead, I would argue that Congress has been slow to act due to mitigating institutional and political factors.
Anecdotally, it is worth noting that I have actually met the brave Iraqi journalist Nour al-Khal and her remarkable American patron Lisa Ramaci-Vincent mentioned in the article by Joseph Huff-Hannon to which the HRHW Roundtable was responding. When Ms. al-Khal was finally admitted to the United States soon after the article was published, the two of them spoke at a Congressional staff briefing which I organized while working as a foreign policy staffer on Capitol Hill this past year.
This incident is illustrative of a broader point—the reason Congress has yet to act on the Iraqi refugee crisis is not out of some illusion that by plugging Iraq’s “brain drain” the country can somehow be packed back together. Indeed, there is a growing understanding on Capitol Hill of the dire urgency and humanitarian import of the Iraqi refugee crisis, and many Democratic members of Congress ran their campaigns in 2006 on the premise that the battle for a stable Iraq has already been lost.
Rather, the immediate challenge has been a matter of workload. When the Democrats assumed control of Congress at the start of 2007, all energy in the field of foreign policy was focused on trying to convince the President to change his overall Iraq strategy. Additionally, a panoply of other foreign policy issues (such as the Iranian nuclear question) made pressing demands on the remaining time and attention of the Democratic leadership. Thus, even though the new Congress was from its start more ideologically responsive to addressing the Iraqi refugee crisis than the Republican-dominated one that preceded it, it took until mid-way through the year before Iraqi refugee issues began to be addressed in earnest.
Those observing Congress finally witnessed a flurry of activity in May and June as Representative Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), Representative Gary Ackerman (D-NY), and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) all introduced comprehensive Iraq refugee bills within a matter of weeks (Professor Susan Waltz briefly cited Kennedy’s Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in her Roundtable contribution). Consequently, Senator Kennedy succeeded in tacking a modified version of his proposal as an amendment onto the Defense Authorization Act that passed the Senate on the 1st of October. This means that the Kennedy program will be debated when the House and Senate go to conference to reconcile their versions of the Authorization Act, after which the conference’s final document will go to the House and Senate floors for a quick up-or-down vote. It is also worth noting that the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), was somewhat ahead of this curve, calling for the assistance and resettlement of Iraqi refugees in a segment of his Iraq Reconstruction Improvement Act introduced in late March.
The Kennedy proposal is by no means perfect. The Senator was compelled to drop a number of important provisions from the bill, including scaling down the number of special immigrant visas from 15,000 per year—as Rep. Blumenauer had called for—to 5,000 and dropping a waiver provision on “material support” so that his Republican counterparts would agree not to obstruct his bill at the committee level.
However, the bill remains an enormous step forward from current U.S. policy on Iraqi refugees. As is, the Kennedy amendment would open the “priority two” category for humanitarian refugees to Iraqis under threat for their association with the United States; it would also make those Iraqis who have loyally served the Coalition effort either in the direct employ of the U.S. or through an affiliated contractor eligible for the special immigrant visas mentioned above. Finally, it would instruct the federal government to set up in-country refugee processing facilities to allow Iraqis under imminent threat to immediately seek asylum straight from Iraq instead of risking life-and-limb to get to Jordan in hopes of being processed there.
There are a number of other potential measures which policymakers would do well to consider. For example, the bill could grant Iraqis temporary protected status, which would prevent those already in the United States who may have overstayed their visas from being forcibly deported to a war zone. The NGO community would be very happy to see the material support provisions put back into Kennedy’s bill and his lesser requirement of 5,000 special immigrant visas rose back up to 15,000.
The bill could also call for the Administration to submit a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to address the crisis, including negotiating memoranda of understanding with host countries to leverage U.S. assistance into guarantees that they will treat refugees in accordance with established international standards of human rights. Such a strategy could also entail soliciting matching donations from European countries and oil-rich Gulf states, which thus far have largely opted-out of this crisis on the mistaken premise that the displacement of millions of Iraqis from their homes is somehow the United States’ problem alone.
While it is regretful that Congressional wheels may at times turn slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect groundbreaking legislation to assist and resettle Iraqi refugees before the year’s end. Then all eyes will be on the executive branch and the international community, in hopes that they match the dire nature of this crisis with the humanitarian response that is required. It is already too late for many unfortunate Iraqis; let us not sit idly on our hands while others perish.
David A. Weinberg is pursuing his doctorate in political science at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is an affiliate of the
Institute's Security Studies Program.
Monday, October 1, 2007
Editor's Introduction - October 2007
“No Refuge Here: Iraqis Flee, but Where?” by Joseph Huff-Hannon. Dissent. Summer 2007.
An Annotation:
Following closely the last installment of the Roundtable, this month we detail another aspect of the human side of the Iraq war: the mass displacement of Iraqis who have fled their country as it crumbles around them. The traumatic process of flight from one’s home cannot be understated and is increasingly entering mainstream dialogue about the war. While these stories are often framed as human-interest pieces, they are underwritten by very real, very serious implications. Unpacking the potential repercussions of another massive refugee population sprawled throughout the Middle East, and to a far lesser extent the West, requires addressing not only particular geopolitical considerations, but also the impact on these people and their communities.
“In much the same way that media images of the flag-draped coffins of U.S. soldiers killed in combat have been kept from the public eye, Iraqis fleeing their war-torn homeland have also been effectively kept out of sight and out of mind by current U.S. refugee and immigration policy.”
If it were the case that Iraqi refugees were allowed to resettle en masse in American cities and towns, the human consequences of this war would be driven home all the more forcefully. In such a scenario, how would Americans respond to the Bush administration’s war policy? Coming face-to-face with those affected so dramatically would possibly have the effect of changing many attitudes toward compassion, away from militancy. Distance has a way of allowing for a detached naïveté in decision-making—the type of ignorance that even good journalism cannot remedy.
“Though historically the world’s largest resettlement destination, the United States has linked refugee policy to foreign policy, making a consistent distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ refugees.”
The old adage of “Give me your tired, your poor…” is sadly accompanied by political fine print. The maxim that has defined America as the universal recipient—the arms unconditionally open to the oppressed and downtrodden—was amended after September 11, 2001, placing enormous burdens on refugees, asylum seekers and all immigrants generally to demonstrate their plight and prove their credibility. While one option available to the U.S. is to exhibit care and concern for the well-being of Iraqis fleeing terror, it seems at every turn policies are enacted that further erodes the moral standing of the superpower.
“With or without a U.S. withdrawal, the current exodus continues and demands an immediate solution.”
As domestic debate rages about the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the discussion must address all possible consequences of withdrawal: those that impact Americans, as well as those that impact Iraqis. This month’s Roundtable highlights the fact that the effects of this war and occupation are far-reaching, beyond the battlefield and into the homes of innocent Iraqis. Therefore, an American exit will also have broad ramifications on the landscape in the Middle East—its countries, its politics, and its people.
These issues and many more are addressed in this month’s installment of Human Rights & Human Welfare’s Roundtable.
~ The Editors
Would Iraqi Refugees Please Disappear
by Richard A. Falk
"The imperial mind tends to be narcissistic: It always insists that its power is deployed for the benefit of others, but when things go wrong, the primary victims are kept at a safe distance so that the metropole is spared the anguish of confronting the havoc that it has caused."
I am grateful to Joseph Huff-Hannon for drawing our attention vividly and movingly to the plight of Iraqi refugees, its magnitude and cruelty. There are more than two million Iraqi refugees, with an estimated 50,000 per month added to the total. Many are languishing in terrible conditions in such neighboring countries as Syria and Jordan. These states, neither of which are notable as places of refuge, lack the capabilities for humane treatment even if their governments were altruistically inclined. Many Iraqis cannot even find such refuge, and remain hapless nomads in search of a sanctuary country. The U.S. refusal to do more than make nominal gestures toward admitting a pitiful few Iraqis is a dimension of the Iraq War that is so scandalous that most otherwise decent people ignore the issue altogether.
This eerie silence is likely to haunt any future understanding of the American role in Iraq, and add gravitas to those who offer dark explanations of what really motivated the invasion and occupation of the country. If refugee policy were established as a test of humanitarian credibility, it would certainly add weight to skepticism about the claims of the Bush presidency—aside from its search for weapons of mass destruction—that a secondary goal was to liberate the Iraqi people from the truly brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. It hardly qualifies as “liberation” if the intervening nation cannot create the minimal conditions of stability required to keep people from fleeing their homes, and enduring the dreadful fate of most refugees. It is a rarely discussed failure of the American policy that so many of the most-highly skilled and financially endowed Iraqis risk life and limb to escape from their country, or failing that, relocate internally away from the combat zones (there are reportedly as many internally displaced Iraqis as refugees, with an additional million expected by the end of 2007).
The U.S. Government and public should certainly be ashamed of its currently miniscule program for the admission of Iraqi refugees. This unwillingness to do more to help Iraqi refugees is certainly by itself dismaying and discrediting, but the deeper issue here is the degree to which this scale of displacement, given a pre-war total Iraqi population of 27.5 million, is a decisive indicator of what a disaster the Iraq War has become for Iraq. Almost all of the American concern about the war continues to be associated with the adverse consequences for us. The imperial mind tends to be narcissistic: It always insists that its power is deployed for the benefit of others, but when things go wrong, the primary victims are kept at a safe distance so that the metropole is spared the anguish of confronting the havoc that it has caused. Consciously or not, this refusal to acknowledge the suffering brought upon the people of Iraq seems mainly to explain why our government lacks the decency to admit Iraqi refugees in far larger numbers.
The refugee issue highlights some other questionable aspects of the American role in Iraq, as in a nested Russian doll that embodies a generally heartless occupation so far as Iraqis are concerned. Perhaps, more disturbing than the callous disregard of the refugees, is the treatment of Iraqi casualties. Early in the occupation, General Tommy Franks dismissed inquiry about Iraqi civilian deaths with the nasty quip, “we don't do body counts.” It is appropriate to personalize American deaths and injuries in the war, but to exhibit indifference to Iraqi civilian losses confirms ugly suspicions of racism and imperial mentality. It conveys to Iraqis, and for that matter to anyone who stops to think, that Iraqi casualties have no bearing on how the United States assesses its approach to the occupation, which is better conceived of as the unfinished, and likely unfinishable, Iraq War. The best estimate by expert, neutral NGOs is that more than one million Iraqi civilians have perished so far. This is a huge figure that if admitted would go a long way to discredit the purported mission.
In recent months, under pressures from Democrats in Congress, the Bush presidency has agreed to evaluate its Iraq policy by reference to no less than 18 so-called “benchmarks.” Not one of these looks at the trends affecting the people of Iraq—for instance, there could be a benchmark involving a decline in the outflow of Iraqis, another on the per-month figures of those internally displaced, and certainly one on the rise and fall of Iraqi civilian casualties. One would search in vain for such benchmarks. The benchmarks are mostly connected with diminishing the American combat role and determining whether the Maliki leadership is capable of producing policy results desired in Washington, especially making the oil industry open to foreign investment and relying on the Iraqi army and police to do more of the fighting, killing, and dying, thereby relieving American troops of that role.
Huff-Hannon is to be commended for writing so well about the plight of Iraqi refugees, but he fails to connect these dots, and therefore does not convey the extent to which the deplorable treatment of Iraqi refugees is an aspect of a far wider pattern of disregard of Iraqi well-being that has had such a devastating effect on Iraq ever since the invasion was mounted in March of 2003. By now, it requires only modest intelligence to understand that as bad as Saddam Hussein was as an oppressive leader, the American-led occupation of Iraq is far worse, at least for the people of the country. For me, this is the primary message of the Iraqi refugee crisis.
As citizens, we should insist that our government adopts a more responsible refugee policy. Yet, more importantly, we should interrogate an approach to military intervention that is supposed to benefit a foreign society and yet makes no effort to assess the losses inflicted on its people. These losses are immense aside from the refugees.
Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His most recent book, The Great Terror War (2003), considers the American response to September 11, including its relationship to the patriotic duties of American Citizens. In 2001 he served on a three person Human Rights Inquiry Commission for the Palestine Territories that was appointed by the United Nations, and previously, on the Independent International Commission on Kosovo. He is the author or coauthor of numerous books, including Human Rights Horizons; On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics; Explorations at the Edge of Time; Revolutionaries and Functionaries; The Promise of World Order; Human Rights and State Sovereignty; A Study of Future Worlds; and This Endangered Planet. Falk also acted as counsel to Ethiopia and Liberia in the Southwest Africa Case before the International Court of Justice.
Will Refuge Continue to be Elusive?
by Katherine Gockel
“...the last thing needed right now is another blame game in Washington. Rather, efforts should be directed toward fixing the problems and developing solutions that consider both current and future migration scenarios for people displaced within Iraq, as well as those who have fled to other countries.”
According to U.N. estimates, if current trends continue, the number of Iraqi asylum seekers by year-end could reach between 40,000 to 50,000. The influx of Iraqis into states such as Syria and Jordan also threatens to be a destabilizing force in those countries. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect these states to individually cope with migration flows of this magnitude.
As conveyed in the Dissent article, the U.S. Government’s response is untenable and unconscionable, particularly given the actions taken by smaller states such as Sweden, and the continued calls from the U.N. and other organizations for greater support. Thankfully, a recent memo sent by the current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, appears to have prodded the U.S. Government to take action. The memo points to coordination breakdowns between various departments of the U.S. Government that resulted in an inadequate response to asylum requests. Yet, the last thing needed right now is another blame game in Washington. Rather, efforts should be directed toward fixing the problems and developing solutions that consider both current and future migration scenarios for people displaced within Iraq, as well as those who have fled to other countries.
A first step in this direction was taken with the appointment of two new officials—James Foley as the coordinator for Iraqi refugee issues at the U.S. Department of State and Lori Scialabba as senior advisor at the Department of Homeland Security. These appointments need to be followed very quickly by bi-partisan plans of action on the part of the Administration and Congress to ensure continued oversight of future activities.
Several key elements need to be part of these plans. First, special attention needs to be paid and policies enacted on behalf of Iraqis who have assisted the U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. As noted in a recent Newsweek article, if and when the U.S. decides to draw down its troop presence, these individuals will be in even more danger than they are now. Therefore, ensuring their security and safety needs to be part of any troop redeployment and force reduction plans.
Second, the U.S. needs to reassess how its strategies and plans can be coordinated as part of a larger, sustained multilateral response. This is necessary due to the magnitude and nature of the current migration patterns and the fact that the security situation in Iraq is not likely to improve in the near future.
A component of this larger multilateral response should be formal requests to Iraq’s Arab neighbors for resources and support. In Track II diplomatic conferences sponsored by the Stanley Foundation in 2006 and 2007, individuals from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states asked for the Iraqis to provide concrete requests for assistance. It was also noted in the 2007 conference that Iraq is a member of the Arab League and as such should be able to rely on fellow member states for assistance.
These conference discussions beg the question as to whether or not these specific assistance requests have been made in support of Iraqis who have fled their homes. If these requests have been made and have gone unanswered, then this lack of response needs to be documented and brought to the attention of the international community. If the requests have not been made, then the Iraqi Government should immediately begin working with these organizations and states to develop plans on how immediate and ongoing assistance can best be provided and sustained until Iraq’s security situation improves. After all, this type of assistance serves everyone’s interest as further destabilization, caused by migration flows, is not in the best interests of the GCC or members of the larger Arab League.
Finally, given the number of Iraqis fleeing to neighboring states such as Syria and Jordan, another component of the multilateral response must be a rethinking of prior refugee strategies, as these displaced populations are not following “typical” refugee behaviors and are not covered under traditional refugee conventions. It will also be important to determine ways to mitigate the destabilizing effects of these Iraqi populations on the states to which they have fled, especially as these states are already grappling with their own security, demographic, and economic issues.
In conclusion, as noted by the authors of the article, the U.S. response to date has not been worthy of the situation it helped create or of its leadership status in the world community. Thankfully, publicity regarding this current sad state of affairs appears to have finally gained the U.S.’s and the international community’s attention which may in turn finally lead to a commendable response. In order to develop and implement the type of future solutions needed, the U.S. must make a concerted effort to work constructively across party lines and within a larger multilateral framework. Otherwise, refuge and sanctuary will continue to be fleeting and the negative fallout from Iraq will continue to cast the world’s only superpower in a disparaging light.
Katherine Gockel is a program officer in the Policy Analysis and Dialogue department. Gockel leads the foundation’s Middle East policy programming and also concentrates on the areas of counterterrorism and failing states. She holds an M.A. in global studies from the University of Denver where she focused on human security and economic development. She also holds an M.B.A. in marketing and a B.A. in communications. Gockel began her career in the business sector where she worked for and with organizations such as AT&T, Sun Microsystems, The National Nanotechnology Initiative, the Center for Teaching International Relations, and Ernst & Young Consulting.
Fleeing from Terror versus Fleeing from Poverty
by Michael Goodhart
“This is not a politically naïve call for granting asylum to all economic migrants. . .Yet ethically and conceptually, there is little basis for treating this category of people differently.”
Nour al Khal worked as a translator for New York Times reporter Steven Vincent, who was murdered by Shiite militants in Iraq. Vincent’s widow has been trying to help al Khal (who was kidnapped and shot by the same group who killed Vincent) win asylum in the United States. So far political and bureaucratic obstacles have proven insurmountable.
Al Khal is one of the millions of Iraqis uprooted by the American-led invasion and occupation, which, Joseph Huff-Hannon reports, has triggered the world’s fastest-growing refugee crisis. The current refugee crisis is the sad, direct, and entirely predictable result of American disregard—if not contempt—for the security and well-being of the Iraqi people. Huff-Hannon joins a long list of journalists, including the New Yorker’s George Packer, who have written about the disturbing failure of American policy with respect to those “Iraqis who trusted America the most. ” The United States clearly has special obligations to those who have directly aided the coalition effort in Iraq; obligations it has recently accepted but so far failed to meet. But t he plight of Nour al Khal also highlights just how restrictive international refugee law can be.
The U.N. Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country....” This is a narrow definition; indeed, the U.S. State Department told Vincent’s widow “that al Khal does not qualify for refugee or asylum status because Iraq is now a democracy, hence there should be no reason she would need to flee.”
International refugee law presently omits at least three common categories of refugee: those fleeing persecution by non-state actors, those fleeing conflict who are not directly threatened with persecution, and “economic migrants.” I shall say something briefly about all three.
Traditionally, the persecution described in the Convention and Protocol was understood to mean “persecution by states.” Increasingly, non-state actors like ethnic militias and insurgent groups that operate outside the (direct) control of states are responsible for persecuting minorities—as in Iraq. International law needs to change to reflect this reality. Moreover, recent asylum cases in the U.S. and Canada have established that threat of female genital mutilation qualifies as a reasonable fear of persecution; still, asylum for women fleeing honor killings has lagged behind, and international law still does not explicitly recognize the specific forms of violence women endure as grounds for asylum (some courts have relied on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and an expansive notion of persecution to make this connection).
A second type of refugee not presently recognized under international law is the person who flees a conflict but is not in direct danger of persecution on the basis of group membership. In many of the sectarian conflicts ravaging the world today, this distinction is hard to maintain. The “normal” tactics of war, including rape, ethnic cleansing, forced evacuation from neighborhoods, routine bombings of civilian targets, and so on, are themselves forms of persecution. In such cases, fleeing a conflict and fleeing persecution amount to more or less the same thing. Again, however, international refugee law does not adequately reflect these changing realities.
Finally, refugee law presently excludes individuals who are seeking a better life, so-called economic migrants. This is probably the most difficult case. Economic migrants appear at first glance to fall into a different category than those I have discussed so far. On closer inspection, however, the apparent differences blur. Persecution involves the systemic and sustained violation of fundamental human rights. But rights to food, clothing, and shelter are every bit as fundamental as rights to associate or to express ideas; dire poverty is a significant threat to life. In cases where corruption, violence, or intimidation result in grinding poverty, the case for treating it as a form of persecution is strong. It might also seem that economic migrants are not fleeing conflict and thus not entitled to refugee status. But structural or enforced poverty seems every bit as much an instance of conflict as gendered violence, which is rightly being recognized as grounds for asylum. In both instances, it is the violation of fundamental rights that represents a form of conflict.
This is not a politically naïve call for granting asylum to all economic migrants. The floods of people who might seek asylum on economic grounds would inundate recipient countries. Yet ethically and conceptually, there is little basis for treating this last category of people differently, and the international community has an obligation to protect and promote the rights of those in dire poverty as well. International development aid is shockingly measly, and few states would acknowledge any kind of binding obligation to give more. States that recognize a legal duty to accept those fleeing political persecution think it perfectly acceptable to deny refuge to people who might be starving.
Much more could and should be done to protect the most economically vulnerable people in the world. Obviously, the devil is in the details. But we should not be misled by those who say the resources are not available; the two trillion dollars the American Government is likely to spend on the Iraq war would have been enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals three to five times over. Protecting the poor is a question of priorities and values, not money.
Michael Goodhart is Associate Professor of Political Science and Women’s Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. His research focuses on democratic theory and human rights, especially in the context of globalization. He has published on these subjects in Human Rights Quarterly, Perspectives on Politics, the Journal of Human Rights, Polity, and elsewhere. Goodhart’s first book, Democracy as Human Rights: Freedom and Equality in the Age of Globalization, was published by Routledge in 2005. He is book review editor at Polity and a past president of the APSA organized section on human rights. For more information visit www.pitt.edu/~goodhart.
The Least We Can Do
by Susan E. Waltz
“Until Iraqis can safely return to their homes, this war is not over. In the meantime, we Americans have a moral imperative to provide refuge to those whose own safety has been put at risk for their efforts to assist the U.S. ”
In the early months of 2003, when the U.S. was only threatening war, humanitarian relief organizations expected thousands of refugees to flee from Iraq into neighboring countries of Jordan and Syria. They were surprised when it did not happen. Four years later, the anticipated wave has at last arrived—and in tsunami proportions.
For more than a decade, specialists have been calling attention to a multitude of problems associated with the international refugee regime. Now, as many as four million Iraqi refugees are at risk of tumbling through one or another of its cavernous cracks, and that is to say nothing of the thousands of internally displaced Iraqis unable to cross an international border.
Several problems plague the international refugee regime—even before you get to the political overtones and undercurrents. To begin with, there is the question of definition. By the terms of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, an individual must pass two tests to be considered a refugee. First, they must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, and secondly, they must have fled their country, crossing an international border. Those who meet these tests have an internationally recognized legal right to claim asylum in a safe country, and receiving countries have a corresponding duty to fulfill that right. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other immigrants do not have legal claim to those same rights—which builds in an internal and perverse incentive to prevent people in trouble from crossing international borders.
Those who succeed in leaving their country face massive bureaucratic entanglement. Western developed countries have their own procedures for granting asylum, and most of them are not triggered until a refugee is actually on that country’s sovereign territory. Most refugees, however, do not get that far—they are lucky to make it to the nearest neighboring country. They queue up to have their eligibility assessed by local offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, or go to plead their case at one or another of the Western embassies in town. And in the meantime, they rely on their own savings, the largesse of the country to which they have fled, or international assistance to address their daily needs—which may include food, shelter, medical assistance, and education. Displaced people who do not succeed in crossing a border may receive some material assistance from international agencies, but they generally are not eligible for help with resettlement or political asylum.
This is the situation facing refugees anywhere in the world, but the Iraqi refugee crisis entails one more crucial political factor: U.S. politics. Until very recently, the U.S. has been unwilling to acknowledge that any Iraqis have a “well founded fear of persecution” because the entire justification for this war was ostensibly to free them from such fears. Although the U.S. has said it would admit a few thousand Iraqis appealing for asylum from abroad (or from within the U.S.), it has not been generous with the assistance it has provided to the U.N., and it has done very little to expedite its own clearance procedures, which have only become more cumbersome in the context of the war on terror.
Following stories like the one in Dissent, several U.S. Senators have introduced the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act to assist Iraqis at grave risk because of their association with Americans or American interests, and provide them an expedited pathway to political asylum. This proposed relief is only a drop in the bucket compared to the need, but it is the least we can do. Sectarian violence, improvised explosive devices, and body counts have been used as metrics for assessing the progress of the Iraq War. The numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons is another measure of the state of affairs in Iraq. Until Iraqis can safely return to their homes, this war is not over. In the meantime, we Americans have a moral imperative to provide refuge to those whose own safety has been put at risk for their efforts to assist the U.S.
Susan Waltz is Professor at the University of Michigan’s Ford School of Public Policy. She has published extensively on the politics of human rights in North Africa and she regularly teaches a graduate course on human rights and public policy. From 1996-1998 Dr. Waltz served as International Chairperson of Amnesty International. On a number of occasions over the past two decades, she has offered expert witness testimony for North Africans seeking asylum in the U.S.
Iraqi Resettlement: Why Congress Won't Act
by Daniel J. Whelan
“If Congress were to open the resettlement gates, the flood might very well put to death forever any possibility of salvaging the wreckage that Iraq has become.”
After making an excellent case for the plight of Iraqi asylum seekers who have served as valuable allies to the United States in Iraq, Joseph Huff-Hannon’s article suggests that Congress should play a stronger role in developing a resettlement policy to allow Iraqis, who have been on “our side,” to come to the U.S. Given the current political climate on Iraq—and with Congressional Democrats desperate to score some kind of victory in its battle with the Bush White House—what exactly is holding them back?
While Congress is usually deferential to the White House in setting broad foreign policy goals when it comes to refugee and asylum policy, Congress’s implied Constitutional authority extends from its express powers to, for example, regulate foreign commerce and establish a uniform naturalization policy. Congress thus would stand on solid Constitutional ground were it to craft an Iraqi resettlement policy.
Furthermore, Congress has been able to exert its will against the President, even when the latter wanted to extend, rather than restrict, asylum status for certain populations. In 1992, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted more than 40,000 Haitians who fled after the ouster of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in late 1991. These refugees were taken Guantánamo Bay for initial asylum-screening. Eleven-thousand were allowed to continue to the U.S. to seek asylum formally. However, 217 of those who were cleared were nevertheless further retained at Guantánamo. They were HIV-positive, and therefore barred entry into the U.S. But they legally could not be returned to Haiti (that would constitute refoulment). They were stuck in limbo, a kind of “permanent exile.”
Since 1987, it had been U.S. policy to exclude anyone with HIV from entering the country—whether tourist, businessperson, immigrant, or asylum seeker. At first, this exclusion was based on specific legislation—an amendment to the immigration law which added HIV to a Congressionally-determined list of “dangerous and contagious diseases” that precluded aliens from entering the U.S. A 1990 overhaul of the Immigration and Naturalization Act replaced the Congressional “list” with a blanket provision allowing exclusion of anyone carrying a “communicable disease of public health significance”—but what would be such a disease was now to be determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), not Congress. Nevertheless, Louis Sullivan—the-then Secretary of HHS—was feeling significant pressure from conservatives and “determined” that HIV was just such a “communicable disease.” That policy was still in effect when the Haitian crisis began.
Bill Clinton, who came into office in early 1993, had vowed to resolve the plight of the Guantánamo detainees—and the 1990 Immigration Law was on his side. He soon directed his Secretary of HHS, Donna Shalala, to remove HIV from the list. But Senate stalwarts (led by Republicans, but joined by plenty of Democrats) moved to block him. They effectively placed HIV permanently on the list “communicable diseases of public health significance” through an amendment to an important reauthorization for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Unable to justify vetoing a bill that included new money for HIV/AIDS research, Clinton signed it. The matter of the Haitian refugees was finally settled by a federal judge who ruled the detention (but not the policy) unconstitutional. While those committed to human rights and sound public health (myself included) may find Congress’ actions in 1993 to be reprehensible, we see how it was able to force the president’s hand and prevail.
So Congress is standing on solid Constitutional ground, and there is a strong precedent in the Haitian HIV case which demonstrates that Congress does has significant “power” to force the President to adopt a policy he may find politically misguided (or embarrassing). On top of that, we must consider how attractive the political nectar of a victory over the White House on some, indeed any, aspect of Iraq policy must be to Congressional Democrats. So what is to stop the current, Democratic Congress from using its authority to address not only a serious moral and humanitarian need (indeed, responsibility) but also to score political points in its battle with the White House over Iraq policy?
I can only come up with one possible answer—and one that, surprisingly, Huff-Hannon completely overlooks. No matter what the contours of the debate in Washington about Iraq policy, no one wants to see a failed state sitting like a very lonely chick under the covetous eye of an Iranian wolf. At the heart of the debate is whether the U.S. is making things better or worse by following the current policy ( U.S. casualties notwithstanding). Congressional Democrats want a stable Iraq. But a stable Iraq means stable, secure Iraqis committed to building their nation and the institutions of government, civil society, and some kind of market economy. Nevertheless, since at least 2005, Iraq has been hemorrhaging talented men and women who are key to any such future for Iraq. If Congress were to open the resettlement gates, the flood might very well put to death forever any possibility of salvaging the wreckage that Iraq has become.
No matter how noble and humanitarian a resettlement policy would be, perhaps those stakes are simply too high—even for a Democratic Congress.
Daniel J. Whelan (Ph.D., DU, 2006) is currently Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations at Hendrix College. He was founding editor (with Laura A. Hebert) of HRHW from 2001-2004, and Senior Editor from 2004-2007. He now serves on the HRHW Editorial Review Board. His doctoral dissertation, "Interdependent, Interrelated, and Indivisible Human Rights: A Political and Historical Investigation," was awarded the 2006 Best Dissertation citation by the Human Rights Section of the American Political Science Association.
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