Editor's introduction: Human Rights & Foreign Policy
Article under review:
“A humane nation is a safer nation” by Tom Porteous. The Guardian. July 7, 2010.
In 1977 the United States President, Jimmy Carter, affirmed “America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy,” a statement that created high expectations for US international actions and fostered great controversy regarding how and under what circumstances states should give priority to human rights considerations in their foreign policy. A few weeks ago, the UK’s foreign secretary, William Hague, said that human rights should be the “irreducible core” of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy. Thirty years after Carter’s statement, it is true that human rights have greater prominence in contemporary foreign policies of more states that at any other time. But it is no less true that in few countries (if any—certainly not in the US or the UK) are international human rights even close to the top of foreign policy priorities. This month’s Roundtable discusses the realties and the limits of states’ human rights foreign policies, taking the example of the UK as presented by Tom Porteous’s piece published in The Guardian, “A humane nation is a safer nation.”
Porteous presents three reasons for having a human rights-friendly foreign policy for the United Kingdom. First, promoting human rights and the rule of law is a good way to secure some of the UK's most important foreign policy objectives, including preventing armed conflict and political extremism, and fostering economic development and political stability. Second, championing respect for human rights and the rule of law sets a good example and is good for the UK's international reputation. And third, the UK is involved in a multifaceted struggle against Islamist militancy that needs to be tackled not by military means alone. In the words of Porteous, “The ideological battle for hearts and minds is just as important, and victory on that front depends on the strictest adherence to human rights standards and the laws of war.”
Our panelists agree on the positive consequences for states that decide to promote international human rights. One additional benefit of adopting a human rights-oriented foreign policy that is highlighted by our contributors is the creation of moral, legal, and political interdependence that can deepen democracy at home. As Brysk notes, “Humanitarian foreign policy turns a spotlight on the very inconsistencies and hypocrisies Porteous chronicles for his own aspiring promoter state—and in some cases, improves them.” Human rights-oriented foreign policy helps democracy promotion and security at home and abroad.
However, our panelists also point out the possible “wrongs” of pursuing an international human rights policy that is based solely on rhetorical commitments. Matching words and deeds is even more pressing when human rights concerns have been identified as the heart of all other relevant policy considerations. The possible dangers are even more striking when governments decide to use human rights language without concrete substance or, even worse, when they use it as a means to reach other foreign policy objectives.
Thus, the concrete and more difficult question is how a country like Britain should promote human rights given its domestic and international constraints. Our contributors explore some possible areas for further concrete action, including international aid, development promotion, and international justice. However, prudence in establishing overly grand policy pronouncements seems to be an important first step for human rights promotion worldwide.
These issues and others are considered in this month’s Roundtable.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
August 2010: Human Rights and Foreign Policy
Editor's introduction: Human Rights & Foreign Policy
Article under review:
“A humane nation is a safer nation” by Tom Porteous. The Guardian. July 7, 2010.
Doing Well By Doing Good
by Alison Brysk
"Not all countries are poised to become global human rights promoters, but the global survey that begins my study shows that dozens more pass a minimum threshold of democracy, development, and security that permits a principled foreign policy. What makes the difference is vision and mobilization—leadership, cosmopolitan values, and an engaged civil society."
As Tom Porteous contends in The Guardian, "a humane nation is a safer nation"—and ultimately, a more prosperous, healthy, happy, and green one too. My recent book, Global Good Samaritans, explores how half a dozen disparate nations came to adopt relatively humanitarian foreign policies, and how this has benefited global governance and their own development. Let us explore the lessons of history that inspired the real (albeit uneven) contributions of countries like Sweden, Canada, and Costa Rica—and why this should inspire more states like the UK to become active human rights promoters.
Our safety and stability are interdependent in a world of global conflict, and the human security approach to global governance has begun to draw attention to the myriad ways we are only as free as our weakest neighbors. Today's refugee may easily become tomorrow's terrorist, and failed states are vectors for all kinds of "global commons" problems--from epidemic diseases to drug trafficking. More broadly, the democratic peace theory of international relations shows that democratic states tend not to engage in conflict with other democracies, suggesting that mediating global conflicts and promoting the rule of law abroad diminishes threats to one's own state or region. In my own study, Costa Rica protected itself from a bad neighborhood by promoting peace, and benefited economically from being an island of stability.
Beyond security interdependence, global good citizenship also pays off in long-term prosperity and quality of life. As former Amnesty International director William Schultz shows in In Our Own Interest, more peaceful and democratic countries make better partners for all of us in trade, tourism, environmental cooperation, and health. Moreover, recent research on economic development shows that the existence of forced or indentured labor in a country is one of the leading determinants of poverty—and that conversely, protecting and empowering vulnerable populations may be the most effective means of poverty alleviation, with local and global benefits.
But perhaps the most important benefit from adopting a human rights-oriented foreign policy is the creation of moral, legal, and political interdependence that can deepen democracy at home. Humanitarian foreign policy turns a spotlight on the very inconsistencies and hypocrisies Porteous chronicles for his own aspiring promoter state—and in some cases, improves them. For example, Canada's strong record and legitimacy claims in peacekeeping allowed much stronger challenges and improvement of questionable practices that developed during its presence in Afghanistan than the unilateralist U.S. This is in part because humanitarian foreign policy springs from (and in turn strengthens) civil society, and helps to build transnational linkages empowering peoples relative to their governments.
Not all countries are poised to become global human rights promoters, but the global survey that begins my study shows that dozens more pass a minimum threshold of democracy, development, and security that permits a principled foreign policy. What makes the difference is vision and mobilization—leadership, cosmopolitan values, and an engaged civil society. We can all do better in the long run by being better global citizens, and greater awareness of the benefits of global goodness should inspire the citizens of all democracies to demand it.
ALISON BRYSK is Mellichamp Professor of Global Governance at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is the author of The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina (1994), From Tribal Village to Global Village (2000), Human Rights and Private Wrongs (2005), and Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy (2009). Professor Brysk has been a visiting scholar in Argentina, Ecuador, France, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Japan. In 2007, she held the Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Chair in Global Governance at Canada's Centre for International Governance Innovation.
UK Foreign Policy and Human Rights
by Par Engstrom
"Given this broader scenario then, support for human rights may indeed serve the UK’s (and the US’s) long-term interests as Porteous suggests. But, just as ignoring human rights can be “a recipe for failure and further instability,” so too can justifying coercive foreign policies by recourse to the rhetoric of human rights have dire consequences. For many in the UK at least, the jury is still out in this regard in relation to most such foreign policy initiatives under the Blair government. There is therefore a strong case for prudence when promoting human rights."
William Hague’s assertion that human rights should constitute the “irreducible core” of foreign policy under the new UK coalition government may seem a radical departure for the new Foreign Secretary. Hague is, after all, a leading figure in the British Conservative Party, which in its recent election manifesto called for the repeal of the UK’s Human Rights Act that incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. Given this profound ambivalence over the substantive value of human rights at home, the new UK government is not likely to adopt more assertive human rights policies abroad. Human rights advocates may lament Hague’s lack of policy details with regards to human rights, but the UK government is likely to continue to pledge allegiance to the lofty ideals of human rights, while resisting providing specific policy details on what role human rights will and should play in the government’s foreign policy. Clearly, it is the role of organizations such as Human Rights Watch to push governments to convert rhetoric into practice. While this endeavour is never uncomplicated, human rights organizations lobbying the UK government are currently facing an increasingly steep uphill struggle.
In recent years, UK governments have been at the forefront in efforts to shift the normative balance between human rights and security in the name of “war on terrorism.” The results of these efforts both at home (explosive growth of anti-terrorism legislation) and abroad (collusion in torture) are widely documented. For many, these threats to human rights have shown the inherent power-based logic underpinning the global human rights regime. For others, however, the resilience and normative strength of the human rights system is demonstrated by the ways in which the human rights discourse has re-asserted itself, challenging even the most powerful.
It is in this fragile domestic and global context that the UK’s future voice on human rights is likely to remain inconsistent at best. Indeed, state policies on human rights tend not to be consistent, especially when human rights policies clash with what is perceived to be in states’ self-interest, whether those interests involve commercial ties with abusing states or the prospects of information from a terrorist suspect subjected to “stress and duress” by foreign intelligence services. Therefore, in relation to international criminal justice, for example, the “push-back from some political leaders determined to avoid accountability” that Tom Porteous refers to may not only come from “the usual suspects,” but could also include Tony Blair, whose indictment by the International Criminal Court was portrayed, in a legally highly implausible but politically suggestive fashion, in Robert Harris’s novel, The Ghost (recently translated to the big screen by Roman Polanski). And it is not likely that the current UK government will take a leading role on issues related to accountability for grave international crimes with British soldiers engaged in increasingly deadly and dirty counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.
Beyond these more immediate human rights concerns however, the global human rights regime is facing potentially even more destabilizing challenges. These are most acutely reflected in ongoing debates surrounding the meaning and wider implications of the rise of non-Western states and shifting global power balances. It is clearly the case that the emergence and consolidation of the international human rights regime has coincided with and resulted from the expansion of the global liberal order sustained and promoted by Western states in general and the US in particular. If power is important in understanding the rise of international human rights, what are then the implications for human rights as power shifts in the international system? Porteous argues that support for human rights can act as a substitute for economic and military power for declining states such as the UK. Yet, values are not easily separated from the hard power that underpins them. As US hegemony (and Western liberalism more generally) becomes increasingly challenged by rising powers, the status of human rights as the dominant moral discourse may come under threat as well. It should therefore be somewhat reassuring for human rights advocates that the evolution of human rights has become, to some extent, decoupled from the hard power of Western states.
Given this broader scenario then, support for human rights may indeed serve the UK’s (and the US’s) long-term interests as Porteous suggests. But, just as ignoring human rights can be “a recipe for failure and further instability,” so too can justifying coercive foreign policies by recourse to the rhetoric of human rights have dire consequences. For many in the UK at least, the jury is still out in this regard in relation to most such foreign policy initiatives under the Blair government. There is therefore a strong case for prudence when promoting human rights. The current UK government is likely–not least given the dismal domestic economic situation—to focus on domestic rather than foreign policy. Hence, even if anyone is willing to listen to the UK government when it comes to human rights, it remains to be seen whether it will have anything to say.
Par Engstrom is lecturer in human rights at the Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study, University of London, and teaches at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the Institute for the Study of the Americas. Current research interests focus on regional human rights institutions both comparatively and with a particular reference to the Inter-American Human Rights System. Further research interests include the relationship between human rights and democratization; transitional justice; the international relations of the Americas; human rights, humanitarianism, and foreign policy; and theories of international relations, particularly relating to international law and institutions. http://sas.academia.edu/ParEngstrom/About
Regenerating Leadership or Rhetoric?
by Marc Alexander C. Gionet
"The true potency of human rights as the nucleus of policy development will be dependent on the level of priority the government places on this ambitious objective and there are competing priorities, especially on the domestic front. The temptation to simply apply the rhetoric of human rights and not the substance will be overwhelming given the level of resources that the protection and promotion of human rights demands."
The new coalition government in the UK is expediting efforts to mark a differentiation from its predecessor. In regards to foreign policy, the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, has identified human rights as the “irreducible core” in his initial speech of a four-part series intended to outline the new government’s priorities and approach.
It is interesting that Secretary Hague would choose “irreducible core” to describe a term which appears only once in a speech containing over 5,000 words. In comparison, “security” appears eighteen times and “influence” twelve. If human rights are indeed to form the core of British policy, this aspirational goal must be weighed against a few inherent realities which are currently challenging the government.
In Secretary Hague’s second speech within the series, delivered in Japan on July 15, 2010, the phrase “humanitarian assistance” was mentioned once, “human rights” was not mentioned at all, and “economic” and “economy” combined were mentioned 38 times within the 3,425 word speech.
The true potency of human rights as the nucleus of policy development will be dependent on the level of priority the government places on this ambitious objective and there are competing priorities, especially on the domestic front. The temptation to simply apply the rhetoric of human rights and not the substance will be overwhelming given the level of resources that the protection and promotion of human rights demands.
A practical example of this is the coalition government’s renewed commitment to meet 0.7% GNI in foreign aid by 2013. If this were an easy objective, the previous UK government (along with its G8 counterparts) would have satisfied the commitment long ago. Justifying such resource allocation in recessionary times when domestic social security cuts are inevitable will be challenging to say the least. The G8, which includes the UK, has already acknowledged that 2010 AIDS treatment targets will not be met following the Summit in Toronto. Accomplishing the 0.7% foreign aid goal or continuing the aspirational rhetoric will be indicative of the government’s true priorities.
In terms of utilizing a moral authority in foreign policy, the UK's self-proclaimed high ground as a rights respecting nation has been visibly eroded following the military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as government complicity in torture and renditions following 9/11. Prime Minister Cameron has made overtures to increase accountability, announcing a judicial inquiry into torture and renditions, almost one year exactly after Gordon Brown announced the Iraq Inquiry.
In terms of Afghanistan, the new coalition government is encountering the problem of declaring a departure from the previous foreign policy approach while still maintaining existing foreign policy commitments. On July 21, 2010, Secretary Hague reported to the House of Commons the results of the Kabul Conference, during which he fully endorsed the Kabul Process and the UK’s combat role for the next five years.
If the new coalition government truly wishes to establish human rights as foreign policy’s “irreducible core,” a substantial effort (even in terms of paying lip service to the idea) remains to be seen. At such an early stage in its mandate, the only praise the UK government can expect is a cautious endorsement of the concept.
Marc Alexander C. Gionet is the Director of the Atlantic Human Rights Research and Development Centre housed at St. Thomas University where he also lectures within the undergraduate human rights programme. Mr. Gionet is currently teaching courses on Humanitarian Law, NGOs and Human Rights and Terrorism and Human Rights. His most recent publication discusses the transfer of Canadian captured detainees to third parties in Afghanistan.
Human Rights at the “Core” of UK Foreign Policy Requires Respect for Core Human Rights
by Erin Mooney
“(…)as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK has a special role and responsibility to strengthen UN efforts to safeguard civilians during armed conflict. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted several important resolutions on the protection of civilians, including specific commitments for protecting children and combating sexual violence in armed conflict. Yet, as outgoing UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (and former British diplomat) Sir John Holmes bemoaned to the UN Security Council last month, for millions of civilians caught in the midst of armed conflict, “too little has changed on the ground.” Much more needs to be done to bridge the gap between the norms espoused at the UN in New York and the harsh realities in the field."
The true measure of whether human rights indeed are the "irreducible core" of the UK’s new foreign policy will be the extent to which the coalition government respects and protects “core” human rights.
Five areas are sure to be critical benchmarks:
First, the government’s commitment to human rights will be evidenced by its own acceptance of these standards. Of the nine internationally-recognized “core human rights instruments,” the UK still is not a party to the conventions concerning the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearances and the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers; nor has it ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Ratifying all of the core human rights instruments is an obvious first step. It follows that the government also must ensure respect for these standards. The assessment of the UK’s human rights record by the Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council pinpointed a number of ways in which the UK must do better. Following up on the various recommendations should be a priority for the government; the UK’s human rights record will be reviewed by the UN again in 2012.
Second, core human rights cannot be a casualty of efforts to combat terrorism. The coalition government sent a strong signal to this effect in June by authorizing an inquiry into allegations that British intelligence officers were complicit in the mistreatment of suspects held by the United States, Pakistan, and other countries. However, the decision to appoint as the judge leading the investigation the very official who has overseen the UK’s intelligence services for the past four years has raised serious concerns about the objectivity of this inquiry.
Third, the UK has obligations under international law to grant asylum to recognized refugees and, for those denied asylum, to refrain from sending them back to countries where their lives would be at risk. Contrary to the advice of the UN Refugee Agency (or UNHCR), the coalition government has continued its predecessor’s policy of deporting rejected Iraqi asylum-seekers back to Iraq where conditions remain, as the Foreign and Commonwealth acknowledges, “highly dangerous.” Moreover, the High Court ruled last month that the policy of “fast-track” deportation of foreign nationals refused permission to remain in Britain (giving deportees but a few hours notice, often late at night, without adequate time to contact legal counsel) was unlawful; the Home Office plans to appeal the verdict.
Fourth, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK has a special role and responsibility to strengthen UN efforts to safeguard civilians during armed conflict. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted several important resolutions on the protection of civilians, including specific commitments for protecting children and combating sexual violence in armed conflict. Yet, as outgoing UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (and former British diplomat) Sir John Holmes bemoaned to the UN Security Council last month, for millions of civilians caught in the midst of armed conflict, “too little has changed on the ground.” Much more needs to be done to bridge the gap between the norms espoused at the UN in New York and the harsh realities in the field. The UK, as the current chair of the UN’s expert group on the issue, has a critical role to play in pushing this agenda forward. Encouragingly, the government has pledged to keep the protection of civilians “at the forefront of our political, security, human rights and humanitarian work.”
Fifth, ensuring that there is no impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations is essential. Historically, the UK has been a leader in such efforts, most notably with the arrest in 1998 of Chile’s former military ruler, Augusto Pinochet, for mass human rights abuses against his own people; and through its support for the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Particularly disappointing, therefore, is the recent announcement by the coalition government’s new Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, that the UK will be “candid friends” with the Government of Sudan. President Omar al Bashir has been indicted by the ICC, accused of masterminding war crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region, where the conflict that has raged since 2003 has caused the deaths of at least 200,000 civilians and the displacement of some 2.9 million. In mid-July, the ICC updated the charges against Bashir to include genocide. “We voiced our concern about certain issues,” Bellingham stated, presumably in an oblique reference to the ICC issue, “but we also said we want the relationship to be a strong one and one where UK bilateral trade will increase,” in particular through investment in Sudan’s oil sector. Oil revenues are widely regarded as having bankrolled the Government of Sudan’s military operations in Darfur. Incidentally, the UK’s decision also flies in the face of oil revenue and anti-terrorism sanctions against Sudan imposed by the US, with whom the UK boasts “our most important relationship” and an “unbreakable alliance.”
Championing a foreign policy based on human rights is one thing; matching lofty words with deeds is quite another. Principled action by the coalition government in these five key areas would be a start.
Erin Mooney is a consultant to the United Nations and the Brookings Institution on issues of human rights and forced migration and Adjunct Professor in International Relations at the University of Toronto (2008-10). The views expressed are those of the author, writing in an independent capacity.
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